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When Is Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Actionable under
Title VII? Fredettev. B VP ManagementAssociates
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine your supervisor at work, Chris, makes sexual advances towards
you. Chris tells you life at work will be much better for you if you just give
in to Chris's demands for sex. You might even get a promotion, and
certainly, extra perks will come your way. Chris's "requests" occur on a
daily basis and make you feel uncomfortable. You ask Chris to stop, but
Chris persists. You complain to Chris's supervisor and nothing happens;
Chris's lewd comments and sexual suggestions continue.
Are you
experiencing sexual harassment that is prohibited by federal law? Maybe. If
Chris is a man, and you are a woman, then, yes, you are experiencing classic
sexual harassment on the job, and Chris's behavior is illegal. Even if Chris is
a woman and you are a man, though less common, Chris's behavior is still
considered to be illegal sexual harassment. But, what if Chris is a man and
you are a man? Or, Chris is a woman and you are a woman? Then, whether
Chris's behavior is illegal sexual harassment depends primarily upon where
you live. It also might depend upon Chris's sexual orientation. This
discrepancy in the courts' interpretation and application of federal law in
same-gender sexual harassment actions is the subject of this article. This
article also explores, in depth, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recent
first impression decision in Fredette v. BVP Management Associates,1
regarding the issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable
under federal law.

II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A FoRM OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."3 It is
generally accepted that the congressional intent of Title VII was to hinder

1. 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3. Id
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racial discrimination. One day before the House of Representatives voted
and approved the Civil Rights Act, the word "sex" was added as a floor
amendment.5 It has been suggested that this last-minute addition was an
attempt to prevent passage of the bill as a whole.6 However, the attempt
failed, and the bill passed with the sex discrimination amendment included
without significant discussion of its meaning or intent prior to its passage.7
The United State Supreme Court first recognized traditional male-onfemale sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 8 in 1986. In Vinson, the
Supreme Court recognized two types of actionable sexual harassment: 1)
quid pro quo harassment; and 2) harassment that results in a hostile or
offensive work environment. 9 In quid pro quo harassment, a supervisor
promises and/or gives specific employment benefits to a subordinate in
exchange for sexual favors.10 In a hostile work environment claim, the
sexual harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the
administrative agency given the authority to enforce Title VII. 2 The EEOC
guidelines define sexual harassment as any unwelcomed behavior of a sexual
nature where: 1) the person's compliance affects some term or condition of
his/her employment; 2) the person exhibiting the unwelcomed sexual
behavior uses the other person's compliance, or refusal to comply, in making
decisions that affect the other's employment; or 3) the unwelcomed behavior
excessively interferes with the person's work or creates an environment that
is "intimidating, hostile, or offensive.' '

4. 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964).
5. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
6. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
7. Id.
8. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. Id. at 62.
10. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.

1982) (alteration in original)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
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Im. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII WHEN
THE HARASSER AND VICTIM ARE THE SAME SEX

A.

UnitedStates Supreme Court

To date, the United States Supreme Court has not reviewed the issue of
whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.
However, on June 9, 1997, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.14 In Oncale, Mr. Oncale alleged quidpro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment by his male supervisor and two
male co-workers. Employed on an offshore oil rig, Mr. Oncale claimed that
the three men sexually assaulted him on at least three separate occasions and
that two of the men threatened to rape him.15 Reluctantly relying upon
"binding precedent 16 established by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,17 the appeals court refused to
recognize Mr. Oncale's claim as viable under Title VII. 18
B.

CircuitCourts ofAppeals

In 1977, in the case of Barnes v. Costle,19 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate level court to recognize
the cognizability of same-gender sexual harassment as discrimination under
Title VII. 20 Although the case dealt with traditional male-on-female sexual
harassment, the court, in a footnote, commented:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on
a male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a
subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the samegender. In each instance, the legal problem would be identical to
that confronting us now-the exaction of a condition which, but
for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.21

14. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,117 S. Ct 2430 (1997), rev'd. 118 S. Ct.

998 (1998).
15. Id. at 118-19.

16. Id. at 120.
17. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
18. Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120 (while this book was in the process of being published, the
United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion, which is discussed in the addendum).
19. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

20. Id. at 984.
21. Id at 990 n.55 (emphasis added).
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Later that same year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals commented on the
same-sex sexual harassment issue parenthetically in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co.:22
It is not necessary to a finding of a Title VII violation that the
discriminatory practice depend on a characteristic "peculiar to one
of the genders,"' ' or that the discrimination be directed at all
members of a sex. It is only necessary to show that gender is a
substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff
"had been
a man she would not have been treated in the same
24
manner."
To date, only five circuit courts have specifically heard and ruled on the
issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII,
with conflicting results. The Eleventh Circuit was the first appeals court to
address the issue, albeit without a published opinion, in Joyner v. AAA
25 In that
Cooper Transportation.
case, a male employee alleged quidpro quo
sexual harassment by a homosexual male supervisor.26 The appeals court
affirmed the district court's holding that "unwelcomed homosexual
harassment... states a violation of Title VII. 27 The court applied the five
elements of quid pro quo harassment as established in Henson v. City of
Dundee:28 "1) the employee belongs to a protected group . . . , 2) the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment . . . ; 3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex . . . ; 4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment... ;
and 5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action., 29 Regarding the critical
third element, i.e., that the harassment complained of was based on sex, the
court stated: "[S]ince the evidence established the terminal manager's
homosexual proclivities, the harassment to which plaintiff complained was
based upon sex." 30 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had not heard
another case on this issue until Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, the
subject of this article.

22. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 1047 n.4 (quoting Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976)).
24. Id. (quoting Skelton v. Blazano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976)).
25. 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (unpublished table decision).

26. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), afl'd, 749

F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).

28. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 903-05.
30. Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 542.
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Nine years passed after the Joyner case before another circuit court of
appeals heard the issue again. In 1993, the Fifth Circuit in Giddens v. Shell
Oil Co. 31 affirmed, without a published opinion, the district court's holding
that same-sex sexual harassment does not state a claim under Title VII. s2
Although the district court's opinion was unpublished, it was
subsequently relied upon by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and quoted in
Garcia:33 "'Harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual
overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination."' 34 As noted above, in
1996, the Fifth Circuit, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
relied upon Giddens and Garcia in affirming that same-sex sexual
harassment is not cognizable under Title VIIIY
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first heard the issue in 1996, in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.3 6 In McWilliams, a
male employee alleged hostile work environment sexual harassment by
several of his male co-workers.3 7 The circuit court of appeals affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendants stating:
As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in common
understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-onheterosexual-male conduct alleged here (nor comparable femaleon-female conduct) is considered to be "because of the [target's]
'sex."' Perhaps "because of' the victim's known or believed
prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexuallyfocussed [sic] speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of' the
perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity.
Certainly, "because of' their vulgarity and insensitivity and
of spirit. But not specifically "because of' the victim's
meanness
38
sex
In his dissent, Judge Michael noted: "It is too early to write this case off to
meanness and horseplay. For now there is a material factual issue whether
McWilliams was discriminated against because of his sex." 39 The Fourth
Circuit again considered the issue two months later in Hopkins v. Baltimore
31. 12F.3d208 (5th Cir. 1993).
32 Id. at 208.
33. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).

34. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
35. 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996).
36. 72F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. Id. at 1194.
38. Id. at 1195-96 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1198 (Michaels, J., dissenting) (arguing that same sex harassment in the
workplace should be actionable under Title VII).
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Gas & Electric Co.,40 but gave no opinion about this issue. In August of
1996, the Fourth Circuit relied upon its holding in McWilliams to affirm a
district court's dismissal of a same-gender sex discrimination action in Mayo
v. Kiwest Corp.41 Most recently, in October of 1996, the Fourth Circuit
refined its holding on the issue by recognizing the possibility of same-sex
sexual harassment of a male by other male co-workers who were
homosexuals, resulting in a hostile work environment. 42 In Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut ofAmerica, Inc.,43 the court stated:
An employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against
"because of' his or her sex if, "but-for" the employee's sex, he or
she would not have been the victim of the discrimination
.... There is... simply no "logical connection" between Title
VII's requirement that the discrimination be "because of' the
employee's sex and a requirement that a harasser and victim be of
different sexes. 44
In Quick v. Donaldson Co. Inc.,45 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court's granting of summary judgment for the
defendant/employer in a situation where a male employee was subjected to
over 100 incidents of "bagging ' ' 6 by his male co-workers.47 Applying the
test established in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,48 the court established:
"The proper inquiry for determining whether discrimination was based on
sex is whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed. ' '49 The court determined that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether the treatment of Quick was based on his gender.50
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's recent holding in Fredette, the Sixth
Circuit was the latest appeals court to weigh in on the same-gender sexual
harassment issue. In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.,51 a male
alleged sexual harassment by a male co-worker who was known to be
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 142.
90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1374 (the court defined "bagging" as the intentional grabbing and squeezing of

a male's testicles).
47. Id.

48. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
49. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
50. Id. at 1379.
51. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
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homosexual.
The court reversed the district court's granting of the
defendants' motion to dismiss noting: "[W]hen a male sexually propositions
another male because of sexual attraction,there can be little question that the
behavior is a form of harassment that occurs
because the propositioned male
53
is a male-that is, 'because of... sex.'
While not specifically addressing the issue, both the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals have acknowledged, in dicta, the cognizability of
same-gender sexual harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII. In
Baskerville v. CulliganInternationalCo.,54 Judge Posner stated, as an aside:
"Sexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do
not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women,
or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be
actionable in appropriate cases., 55 Also, in Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co.,56 the court stated: "[A]lthough words from a man to a man are
differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do not rule out
the possibility that both men and women working at Showboat
have viable
57
claims against [the male supervisor] for sexual harassment."
C.

DistrictCourts

The remaining seven circuits courts of appeals 58 have not ruled on the
issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII, but all have district courts that have heard and ruled on the issue.
District courts in the First, Second, and District of Columbia Circuits have
consistently held that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII, but with a limited number of judicial opinions to support their
holdings.5 9 District courts in the Third and Tenth Circuits have also
consistently allowed same-gender sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
both with slightly more supportive case law than the First, Second, and

52. Id. at 444.

53. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
54. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).

55. Id. at 430.
56. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 1464 (emphasis in original).
58. Specifically, the First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of

Columbia Courts.
59. King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62 (D.N.H. 1996); Williams v. District of
Columbia, 916 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C.
1995); Nogueras v. University of P. R., 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995).
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District of Columbia Circuits. 60 The decisions of the district courts in the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits that have heard the issue can only be described as
contradictory.
District courts in the Seventh Circuit have heard eighteen cases on the
issue of same-gender sexual harassment since 198 1.61 This is equal to the
number of cases on the issue heard by district courts in all other circuits
combined. The first case on point in the Seventh Circuit, Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services, Inc.,62 was decided in 1981.
The court
unequivocally recognized the actionability of Mr. Wright's claim under Title
VII when he was terminated from his job because he refused the homosexual
advances of his male supervisor. 63 The court relied on dicta in Barnes v.
Costle,64 a 1977 decision, from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Seven years later, Judge Williams refused to recognize a Title VII claim
in Goluszek v. Smith.65 Mr. Goluszek alleged hostile work environment
60. Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1997); Eschbach v. County of
Lehigh, No. CIV.A. 95-7276, 1997 WL 109611 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997); Wiley v. Burger
King, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 500 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F.
Supp. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo.
1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Wehrle v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okl. 1996); Johnson v. Community
Nursing Serv., 932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996); Ladd v. Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity
Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Okla. 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
61. Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7740
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1997); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Torres v.
National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. 111. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co.,
941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis.
1996) affd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.
Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Wenner v.
C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F.
Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Boyd v. Vormahmen, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. II. 1995); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C 4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1990); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
62. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).

63. Id. at 310.
64. 561 F.2d 983 (D.D.C. 1977).
65. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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sexual harassment by several male machine operators at H.P. Smith.66
Relying, in part, on a HarvardLaw Review article, written by a student
Judge Williams stated that the behavior Mr. Goluszek had been subjected to
was not the type Congress intended to prohibit under Title VI. 67 Rather,
according to Judge Williams, Congress enacted Title VII to protect
vulnerable persons from those more powerful, who exploit their power by
inflicting sexual demands upon the weaker group. 68 Finding that Mr.
Goluszek worked in a male-dominated environment, Judge Williams wrote:
"In fact Goluszek may have been harassed 'because' he is a male, but that
harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the
workplace."6 9 Judge Williams's opinion in Goluszek has been occasionally
relied upon; sometimes openly criticized, 70 and often distinguished or
ignored by judges, 71 including other district court judges within the Seventh
66. Id. at 1453.
67. Id. at 1456.
68. Id.

69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Fleenor v.
Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th
Cir. 1994); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp.
521 (D.S.C. 1995); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
aff'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Tex. 1992).
71. Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("Reliance on
Goluszek is misplaced.... [IThe Goluszek court built its understanding of Congressional
intent upon a foundation of quicksand.... [Tihe Goluszek court had no basis for its gloss on
Title VII's legislative history. Not only is it inappropriate to delve into Congressional intent
when the statute's language is clear, Goluszek is simply not persuasive or reliable authority for
interpreting Title VII's provisions on sex discrimination."); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick,
GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Minn. 1996) ("We are not persuaded by the rationale
articulated in Goluszek"); Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148, at *1
(N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 1996) ("[Tjhis Court has disagreed sharply with Goluszek from the
beginning-in this Court's view, that decision and others like it represent a kind of social
judgment about Congress' purposes in enacting Title VII that is at odds with what Congress
actually said."); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996)
('Notwithstanding the Goluszek court's sweeping statements regarding Congressional intent,
its analysis is unsupported by any legislative history.... Moreover, the additional requirement
imposed by Goluszek on a sexual harassment plaintiff is an unwarranted extension of the
elements of proof set forth by the Supreme Court .... "); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc.,
70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Goluszek has... developed into a
favored target ofjurisprudential criticism, most of which makes sense."); Easton v. Crossland
Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("In Goluszek, the court explored
the 'underlying concerns of Congress' to determine that Title VII did not apply to a male
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Circuit.72 The other sixteen cases heard within the district courts of the
Seventh Circuit have, for the most part, recognized a claim for same-gender
sexual harassment under Title VII. 3 The exceptions consist of three cases
versus male hostile environment claim ....As logically appealing [as] this argument may be,
it does not reflect the current state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence."); King v M.R.
Brown, 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("This Court respectfully declines to follow
the reasoning of Goluszek... that the only sex discrimination Title VII endeavors to prevent is
that 'stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."') (quoting Goluszek
v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988)); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Unfortunately, the district court in Goluszek did not support
its view of Congress's intent with any citations to the legislative record."); Prescott v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("While
[the] argument [in Goluszek] may be logically appealing, it is not the current state of antidiscrimination jurisprudence.").
72. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Harris v.
National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 WL 709653 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1997);
1996); Schoiber v. Emro
Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. I11.
Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. II. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403
(E.D. Wis. 1996); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of II1., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1760 (N.D. I1l. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. Il.1996);
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996); Rushing v.
1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair
United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Va. 1995); Wenner v. C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995);
Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.4:94cv165, 1995 WL 810016 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 23, 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No.
89C4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. III. Oct. 16, 1990).
73. Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7740
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1997); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Torres v.
National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co.,
941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis.
1996) affid, 125 F. 3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.
1996);
Supp. 781 (C.D. I1l. 1996); Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. I11.
Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. II1. 1996); Wenner v.
C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F.
Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C 4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1990).
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heard before Judge Norgle, who gives a thoughtful and thorough analysis of
his reasoning for not allowing same-gender sexual harassment claims in two
of his three opinions on the issue.74 Referring to Judge Posner's affirmation
of the possibility of same-gender sexual harassment in dicta in Baskerville,
and relying, ultimately, upon his own interpretation of Congress's intent in
passing Title VII, Judge Norgle states:
[T]he court agrees with Chief Judge Posner that sexual harassment
occurs in male-on-male and female-on-female formats, though less
frequently than in the prevalent male-on-female harassment cases.
Yet, Title VII's drafters did not intend to protect one gender from
the sexual conduct of those of the same-gender, and therefore, Title
VII cannot be a vehicle for sexual harassment litigation between
individuals of the identical gender. No matter whether the predator
is a homosexual or heterosexual, and no matter whether the prey is
sexually attracted to men or women, Title VII 75does not allow for
claims alleging same-gender sexual harassment.
Finally, in Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc.,76 and Vandeventer v.
Wabash NationalCorp.,7 Judge Sharp appears to come out on both sides of
the question, but his opinions are, in fact, consistent. While the opinion in
Blozis is dated before that in Vandeventer, Judge Sharp obviously wrote the
Vandeventer opinion first, as he distinguishes it in the Blozis opinion.78 In
Vandeventer, the plaintiff, Douglas Feltner, alleged he had been sexually
harassed by a male co-worker who had called him a "dick sucker" and a
homosexual.79 Judge Sharp stated: "[A] man can state a claim under Title
VII for sexual harassment
by another man only if he is being harassed
80
because he is a man."
While the epithet used and the taunting had a 'sexual' component,
as do most expletives, the crucial point is that the 'harasser' was
not aiming expletives at the victim because of the victim's
maleness. He was taunting the victim because he did not like him;
Mr. Feltner's gender was irrelevant.... Thus, [his claim is] not
actionable under Title VII.81

74. Harris,No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 7740; Torres, 943 F. Supp. at 952;

Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
75. Schoiber,941 F. Supp. at 739.

76.
77.
78.
79.

896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
Id. at 1181 n.2.

80. Id. (emphasis in original).

81. Id.
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In Blozis, Judge Sharp allowed the claim of same-gender sexual harassment
to go forward, refusing to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. 82 He
distinguished his decision here from his summary judgment ruling in
Vandeventer, noting courts' general reluctance to grant motions to dismiss
and the fact that the plaintiff in Vandeventer produced no evidence that he
was harassed because he was a male.83 In Blozis, Judge Sharp found that it
was the existence of a male or female bias that was protected by Title VII
and not just being subjected to sexual comments or actions. Though he
expressed some doubt about the cognizability of male bias between
heterosexual men, he acknowledged that
it might be possible to prove and
84
allowed Mr. Blozis' claim to proceed.
Finally, the district courts in the Ninth Circuit are also conflicted on the
issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII, but with very little case support on either side. 5 In Ashworth v.
Roundup Co.,86 the court refused to recognize the possibility of same-gender
sexual harassment under Title VII, relying upon the decision in Goluszek and
Garcia.7 In Easton v. CrosslandMortgage Corp.,8 8 and Tanner v. Prima
Donna Resorts, Inc., 9 the judges were critical of the Goluszek decision and
allowed the claim.
IV. FREDETTE V. BVP MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES
A.

Backgroundof the Case

Robert Fredette, a male heterosexual, worked from 1988 until 1994 as a
waiter at Arthur's 27, a restaurant in the Buena Vista Palace Hotel in
Orlando, Florida. BVP Management Associates owned and operated
Arthur's 27 during the time of Mr. Fredette's employment. Dana Sunshine, a
male homosexual, was the maitre d'/manager of the restaurant during the
time of Mr. Fredette's employment. As manager, Mr. Sunshine had the
authority to hire, fire, and schedule the servers. 90
82. Id. at 808.
83. Blozis, 896 F. Supp. at 806.
84. Id. at 808.
85. Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); Easton v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
1997); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
86. 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
87. Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 489.
88. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997).
89. 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996).
90. Brief for Appellant at 4, Fredette,(No. 95-3242) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
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Mr. Fredette alleged that Mr. Sunshine sexually harassed him over the
course of several years. The alleged harassment began shortly after Mr.
Fredette began to work at Arthur's 27. He claimed that Mr. Sunshine told
him of an easy way for him to get promoted, and he should see him on his
day off so they could discuss it. Mr. Fredette told Mr. Sunshine he preferred
to be promoted through his hard work. Mr. Sunshine then, allegedly,
grabbed his crotch, shook it at Mr. Fredette, and said that being "'hard is
exactly what it takes."' 91 Mr. Fredette alleged that Mr. Sunshine repeatedly
sexually propositioned him and that some92of these propositions were made
with the promise of a raise or a promotion.
Other male servers at the restaurant some homosexual and some
heterosexual, testified to Mr. Sunshine's sexual harassment of them. Mr.
Fredette also alleged that one male homosexual waiter, with no fine dining
experience, was promoted by Mr. Sunshine after providing Mr. Sunshine
with sexual favors. This waiter allegedly told Fredette: "'[U]se your
imagination, you don't have to know how to wait tables to get what you want
around here.' 93 Allegedly, Mr. Sunshine's sexual partner told Mr. Fredette
and other servers that they could get better table assignments by giving in to
Mr. Sunshine's requests.Z Despite his refusals of Mr. Sunshine's requests,
Mr. Fredette was promoted to captain in November of 1989, six months after
beginning work. He retained that position until his resignation in February of
1993. 9'
In January of 1993, Mr. Fredette became intoxicated at the restaurant's
bar and caused a disturbance. 96 As a result of his drunken behavior, he was
suspended for three days, required to obtain counseling for alcohol abuse,
and subjected to random drug testing. Upon returning to work, Mr. Fredette
met with the Human Resource Manager of the hotel and, for the first time,
complained of Mr. Sunshine's sexual harassment. The Director of Human
Resources met with Mr. Sunshine who denied most of the allegations.
Mr.
7
Sunshine was given a written warning as a result of that meeting.1
Following his meeting with human resources personnel, Mr. Fredette
was no longer sexually harassed by Mr. Sunshine. However, Mr. Fredette
claims that Mr. Sunshine subjected him to retaliatory actions by
reprimanding him for minor infractions, assigning him to fewer or lower91. Brief for EEOC at 3, Fredette, (No. 95-3242) (quoting Fredette deposition)
[hereinafter Brief for EEOC].
92. Brief for Appellant, supranote 90, at 4.
93. Brief for EEOC, supranote 91, at 4-5 (quoting Fredette deposition).
94. Brief for Appellant, supranote 90, at 5.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Brief for Appellee at 7, Fredette,(No. 95-3242) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].

97. Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 5-6.
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tipping tables, and by having other employees complain about him. 98 On the
advice of his doctor, Mr. Fredette resigned from his position on February 6,
1993. 99
B.

ProceduralHistory

On March 17, 1994, Mr. Fredette filed suit against Mr. Sunshine, BVP
Management Associates, Royal Palace Hotel Associates, and Buena Vista
Hospitality Group.100 In his complaint, Mr. Fredette alleged violations of
Title VII, the Florida Human Rights Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 10' Specifically, Mr. Fredette alleged hostile work environment and
"quidpro quo sexual harassment."' 0 2
On July 6, 1994, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that he could not be held individually liable for sexual harassment. A
magistrate judge reviewed the motion and recommended its denial. 0 3 On
October 26, 1994, the United States District Judge agreed with the Magistrate
04
Judge's recommendation and denied Mr. Sunshine's motion to dismiss.1
On February 16, 1995, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, again claiming he could not be held individually liable for sexual
harassment. Mr. Fredette filed his opposition to Mr. Sunshine's motion on
March 17, 1995. On May 1, 1995, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion for summary
judgment. On May 10, 1995, the magistrate issued a report regarding Mr.
Sunshine's motions. 0 5 In his report, he recommended that Mr. Sunshine's
motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted as Mr. Sunshine was not a
proper defendant under Title VII or the Florida Human Rights Act. 10 6 On
June 19, 1995, the district judge approved
the magistrate's report and
10 7
dismissed all claims against Mr. Sunshine.
On April 19, 1995, Mr. Fredette voluntarily dismissed his claims against
Royal Palace Hotel Associates and Buena Vista Hospitality Group.'0 On
May 9, 1995, BVP filed a motion for summary judgment stating that Title
VII does not prohibit same-gender sexual harassment. BVP claimed that
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
100. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 2.
101. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 2.
102. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1504 (11th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
103. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id..
107. Id.
108. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 3.
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Congress did not intend to protect men in a male-dominated work
environment and that Mr. Fredette may have been discriminated against, but
the discrimination was due to his sexual preference and not because of his
gender. Title VII, BVP claimed, does not protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 1 9 On June 5, 1995, Mr. Fredette filed
opposition to BVP's motion for summary judgment. 10 Mr. Fredette claimed
that Title VII does protect against same-gender sexual harassment when the
harassment is an attempt to extract sexual favors because he is a male."'
On June 30, 1995, the magistrate issued a report and recommended that
the district judge deny BVP's motion for summary judgment." 2 The
magistrate relied on his interpretation of the plain language of the applicable
statutes, prohibiting discrimination based on sex regardless of the gender of
the alleged harasser or the victim." 3 He noted that, if the harassment would
not have happened
but for the victim's gender, then Title VII protections
n4
would apply.
On September 11, 1995, the district judge refused to accept the
magistrate's recommendations and issued an order granting BVP's motion
1 15
for summary judgment under Title VII and the Florida Human Rights Act.
The judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation regarding the denial of
BVP's motion on the Fair Labor Standards Act claim, stating a genuine issue
of fact remained to be resolved." 6
In granting BVP's motion on the Title VII and Florida Human Rights
Act claims, the district judge agreed with BVP that the alleged discrimination
of Mr. Fredette was based on his sexual orientation and was not, therefore,
actionable under Title VII.1 7 "[T]he determinative factor is that the
discrimination or harassment would not have occurred 'but for the fact of
[the plaintiffs] sex.""'18 But, the judge added, "[T]he term 'sex' as used in
Title VII is not synonymous with 'sexual preference."" 1 9 Quoting from
Garcia,120 the judge wrote: "'[H]arassment by a male supervisor against a
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 5.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 2.
Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 5-6.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 6.

114. Id.
115. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 7.
118. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 905 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth Cir. 1982)) (alteration made by
Fredettecourt).
119. Id.
120. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
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male subordinate does not [necessarily] state a claim under Title VII even
though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender
discrimination."",12 ' The judge justified his decision by claiming that Mr.
Fredette would not have suffered the discrimination if he had given in to Mr.
Sunshine's requests.
Thus, if Fredette suffered the claimed harassment or discrimination
at the hands of the restaurant manager, it stemmed not from the
fact that Fredette was a man, but rather from the fact that Fredette
refused the manager's propositions and did not share the same
sexual orientation or preferences as the manager. Title VII does
not provide a cause of action for discrimination or harassment
levied because of one's sexual orientation or preference. Any
expansion of Title VII... that would include such a cause of
action is for... Congress... and not this court, to make. 12
On September 21, 1995, Mr. Fredette filed a notice of appeal of the
district court's judgments in favor of Mr. Sunshine and BVP.123 The parties
agreed to dismiss the Fair Labor Standards Act claims and, in December of
1995, Mr. Fredette dismissed the claims against Mr. Sunshine.124 The case
proceeded on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on Mr.
Fredette's claim against BVP Management Associates for
12 discrimination in
violation of Title VII and the Florida Human Rights Act. 1
C. Appeals Court's Holding and Rationale
The court narrowly defined the legal issue in Fredette: "[W]hether,
under the circumstances of this case, the sexual harassment of a male
126
employee by a homosexual male supervisor is actionable under Title V.'
In deciding that Mr. Fredette's claim was actionable under Title VII, the
court considered five areas: 1) the language of Title VII; 2) the statute's
causation requirement, that the discrimination occurred "because of" the
person's sex; 3) the legislative history of Title
VII; 4) the EEOC's
127
interpretation of Title VII; and 5) relevant case law.
First, the court quoted and reviewed the wording of the statute itself.
Focusing on Congress's use of such gender neutral terms as "employer" and
121. Fredette, 905 F. Supp. at 1037 (quoting Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)) (alteration made by the Fredette court).
122. Id. at 1037-38 (citations omitted).
123. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
124. Id.

125. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1504 (11th Cir. 1997).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1504-06.
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"any individual," the court said, "[t]here is simply no suggestion in these
that the cause of action is limited to opposite gender
statutory terms
128
contexts."
Many courts have used, to some extent, a similar interpretation of the
statute's plain language and relied on it in finding same-gender sexual
harassment claims actionable under Title VII. 129 The court in Easton v.
CrosslandMortgage Corp.130 established: "Where the statutory
3 language is

clear, our sole function is to enforce it, according to its terms."'

The Fredette appeals court then looked to the statute's causation
requirement, that the alleged discrimination be "because of" the person's sex.
Comparing Mr. Fredette's male-on-male sexual harassment by Mr. Sunshine

to a traditional male-on-female situation, the court noted that "[t]he
128. Iaeat 1505.
129. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Through its proscription of 'employer' discrimination against 'individual' employees, the
statute obviously places no gender limitation whatsoever on the perpetrator or the target of the
harassment"); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("Title ViI's
plain language is broad and does not limit its prohibition on sex discrimination to
discrimination of one sex by the other."); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409
(E.D. Wis. 1996) aff'd, 125 F. 3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The statutory language of Title VII is
non-exclusive and protects all employees from gender discrimination inflicted by an
'employer.' The gender of the harasser is irrelevant."); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of
IIl., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760, 1762 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The statute is clearly
worded in gender neutral terms, and no legislative history exists to contradict a gender neutral
reading."); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996) ("[Title
VII [does not] refer to the sex of the offending party or the sex of the victim."); King v. Town
of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.H. 1996) ("liThe text of Title VII [does not place] a
restriction on the gender of the discriminator."); Wang v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc.,
930 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Minn. 1996) ("[Tihe language [of Title VII] is gender neutral.");
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) ("The text of [Title VII] is
gender neutral and contains no suggestion that the sex of either gender is a prerequisite to
maintaining a claim under Title VII."); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Tjhere is nothing in the language of Title VII to support a
finding that same sex harassment is not prohibited."); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,
905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1995) rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Tihe plain
language of Title VII... does not preclude a same-gender sexual harassment claim for
relief."); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[N]othing in the
text of the statute indicates that Title VII's protections extend only to individuals who are
harassed by members of the opposite sex."); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp.
1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill. 1995) ("The plain language of Title VII simply does not restrict its
prohibition against discrimination to employees of the opposite sex."); McCoy v. Johnson
Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("UIhe plain language of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 does not limit Title VII to heterosexual harassment.").
130. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
131. Id. at 1378 (quoting Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S 64 (1993)).
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reasonably inferred motives of the homosexual harasser are identical to those
of the heterosexual harasser-i.e., the harasser makes advances towards the
132
victim because the victim is a member of the gender the harasser prefers."'
Also, the court found, that since the alleged harassment experienced by Mr.
Fredette was not experienced by women at the restaurant, this supported Mr.
Fredette's claim that he133was harassed because of his gender, in other words,
because he was a man.
In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.,3 a male employee
alleged sexual harassment by a male co-worker, a known homosexual. 135 In
Yeary, the court held: "[W]hen a male sexually propositions another male
because of sexual attraction,there can be little question that the behavior is a
form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male-that is, 'because of... sex."' 136 Two other courts have allowed Title VII
causes of action where the alleged harasser was known to be homosexual,
finding the fact that the harasser was a homosexual as support of the
plaintiff's position that he/she was harassed because of his/her sex.137 Other
courts have found the homosexuality of the harasser persuasive, but not
conclusive,
in determining that the plaintiff was harassed because of his/her
13 8
sex.

Next, the appeals court looked to the legislative history and intent of
Title VII. The court said, "we find nothing in the legislative history that
132. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
133. Id.
134. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
135. Id. at 445.
136. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
137. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e hold
that a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII
where a homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates against an employee of the
same sex or permits such discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the
same sex."); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102-03 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
("[I]t is obvious that sexual harassment by a homosexual supervisor of the same sex is
exaction of a condition of employment which, but for his or her sex, an employee would not
have faced.").
138. See McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga. 1997)
("[Specific courts] have held that Title VII provides a cause of action for same-sex harassment
if the harasser is homosexual, but not if the harasser is heterosexual.... This Court finds
[these holdings] more consistent with the language of Title VII and the judicially-created
doctrine of sexual harassment."); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.N.J. 1997)
("Like any other sexual-harassment plaintiff, plaintiff must still prove that the sexual
harassment he suffered was "because of' his sex'-that had he been a woman, he would not
have been subjected to Mr. Worley's sexual harassment."); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[P]laintiff must still prove that the alleged
harassment was 'because of his sex.").
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to exclude same-sex harassment claims
suggests an express legislative 1intent
39

from the purview of Title VII.

Many courts have lamented about the lack of congressional intent
regarding Title VII. 140 Most of those courts have overcome the lack of intent

and found same-gender sexual harassment claims actionable under Title
VII.141 However, Judge Mumaghan, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,

Inc., gave this critical dissent:
The majority treats the absence of legislative history as a license to
'legislate' and impermissibly to rewrite Title VII to include claims
never intended, nor contemplated, by Congress. The majority's
approach ignores the context within which Congress enacted Title
VII. The absence of legislative history to guide the courts can be
read in either of two ways. Either, as the majority argues,
Congress's failure to exclude the possibility of same sex claims
should be interpreted as allowing for such claims. Or, Congress
simply never fathomed that Title VII would be used in the manner
in which the majority today holds, and hence, Congress, not the
courts, should address, in the first instance, whether Title VII's
'sex' language should apply when a heterosexual male alleges that
he was harassed by a homosexual male. The instant case
demonstrates the wisdom of the Constitution's three branches of

139. Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).
140. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut Am. Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against
discrimination based on 'sex."') (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986);
Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[Tjhere is no legislative history
on the meaning of 'sex discrimination."'); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("There is no legislative history on the meaning of 'sex
discrimination."'); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Utah
1996) ("Legislative history is silent"); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351,
354 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[T]here is little legislative history regarding the scope of the sex
discrimination prohibition."); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa.
1995) ("[N]o legislative history exists on this issue."); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887
F. Supp. 1133, 1137 n.3 (C.D. II. 1995) ("The Court also notes that little legislative history
exists on Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination."); EEOC v. Walden Book Co.,
Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Virtually no legislative history is available
to guide the courts in interpreting Title VII's interpretation against discrimination based on
sex.") Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (D. Nev. 1995) ("The result is a
paucity of legislative history to inform the courts what Congress intended.").
141. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 138; Caldwell, 958 F. Supp. at 962; Swage, 72 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. at 438; Johnson, 932 F. Supp. at 269; Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 351; King, 911 F.
Supp. at 161; Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1133; Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 100.
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government, which leaves to the legislative
branch, not the
2
judiciary, the task of making the law. 11

Like the appeals court in Fredette, at least three other courts have found that
the lack of legislative intent does not negate the possibility of same-gender
actions."43
Also regarding congressional intent, the Fredette court noted: "The
obvious Congressional focus on discrimination against women has not
144
precluded the courts from extending the protections of Title VII to men."
This reverse discrimination analogy used in same-gender actions was relied
upon by41the courts in EEOC v. Walden Books,145 and Sardiniav. Dellwood

Foods.

Next, the court considered the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. In a
footnote, the court recognized the EEOC's expertise that, while not binding
on courts, can be useful for interpretation of and guidance in Title VII
actions. 147 The court quoted the EEOC's Compliance Manual that explicitly
states that sexual harassment can exist even if the harasser and victim are not
of opposite genders."48 Instead, the EEOC recommends that the focus be on
the disparate treatment of one person by another and sexual harassment based
on a person's sex.149 The court quotes a specific example in the EEOC
Compliance Manual of sexual harassment where the harasser and victim are,
in fact, the same sex.150 Many other courts have relied, in part, on the

142. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145.

143. See Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of II1., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1760, 1762 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[N]o legislative history exists to contradict a gender neutral
reading."); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996) ("There is no
legislative history that suggests that victims of sexual harassment must be sexually harassed
by harassers of the opposite sex before they may invoke the protections of Title VII.");
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("[Tlhere is little legislative history to support such a claim [that same sex harassment is not
prohibited under Title VII].").
144. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
145. 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("It would be untenable to allow
reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title
VII.").
146. 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("I agree with those
courts... which finds [sic] it 'untenable to allow reverse discrimination cases but not samesex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title VII.") (quoting EEOC v. Walden Book
Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)).
147. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505 n.4.
148. Id. at 1505.
149. Id. at 1505-06.
150. Id.
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sexual harassment in
EEOC's recognition of the possibility of same-gender 1 51
action.
VII
Title
same-gender
a
in
plaintiff
a
for
finding
Finally, the Fredette appeals court looked for guidance from case law
precedent in making its decision. It noted that the United States Supreme
1 52
Court has not explicitly ruled on the same-gender sexual harassment issue.
However, the appeals court stated that the United States Supreme Court did
rule on a case of reverse employment discrimination. In Johnson v.
TransportationAgency, 153 a male supervisor's decision to promote a female
over a male employee was analyzed by the Court for possible discrimination
under Title VII. 54 The appeals court found that the United States Supreme
Court's acknowledgment of this type of reverse discrimination claim with
same-gender undertones was enough, at least
155 implicitly, to support the idea
of same-gender sexual harassment claims.
The Fredette court then looked at cases beyond the Eleventh Circuit,
relying especially upon the decisions of the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts
of Appeal in Yeary and Wrightson. The court found both of those cases
factually similar to Fredette as the male victims had been sexually harassed
by a male homosexual. In both Yeary and Wrightson, the courts allowed the
plaintiffs' claims to continue. The Fredette court also noted supportive dicta
in Barnes v. Costle, Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,
Baskerville v. Culligan InternationalCo., and Steiner v. Showboat Operating

151. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J.
1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); Miller v. Vesta,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D.
Wis. 1996); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760
(N.D. I1l. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996); Swage v. Inn
Philadelphia, 72 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Wehrle v. Office Depot
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okl. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs. 932 F. Supp.
269 (D. Utah 1996); Wang v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Il1. 1996); Ladd v.
Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Olk. 1995);
Sardinia v. Dellwood, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ecklund v.
Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. CIV.A.4:94cv165, 1995 WL 810016 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1995); Raney v. District of
Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-237218AJ, 1995 WL 316783 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995).
152. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).
153. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
154. Id. at 616.
155. Id.
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Co., 156 and cited, in a footnote, to several district court cases that have

recognized
the cognizability of same-gender sexual harassment under Title
I5 7

VII.

The Fredette court criticized the decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Oncale and Garcia. First, the court examined what it determined
to be those courts' lack of reasoning in reaching a decision that all samegender sexual harassment claims are not actionable. The Fredette court then
went on to factually distinguish Oncale, where the behavior was "teasing and
harassment with sexually-focused speech or conduct' 158 between coworkers
and not a supervisor's request for sexual favors from a subordinate. The
Fredette court was also critical of the district court's decision to not
recognize a same-gender sexual harassment claim in Goluszek v. H.P. Smith.
Again, finding the court's reasoning flawed, and relying upon judicial
acceptance of reverse discrimination actions, the Fredette court noted that
there is no need to demonstrate a male dominated environment, as required in
Goluszek.
Both the lower district court and BVP Management Associates asserted
that the harassment suffered by Mr. Fredette was based upon sexual
orientation, and not upon gender. The appeals court concluded that its
decision to allow Mr. Fredette's claim for same-gender sexual harassment
was, in no way, an endorsement of sexual harassment claims based upon
sexual orientation. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e hold today that
when a homosexual male supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male
subordinate and conditions work benefits or detriment on receiving such
favors, the male subordinate can state a viable Title VII claim for gender
discrimination.' 59

156. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508.
157. Id.; McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); Williams
v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick,
GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229
(S.D. Ga. 1995); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D.
Ala. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. I11.1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd.,
905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D.
Ala. 1983), Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
158. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508 (1lth Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at 1510 (emphasis in original).
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V. CONCLUSION

The significant trend by courts is to find sexual harassment claims
actionable under Title VII. Title VII's obvious intent, regardless of the lack
of specific legislative history, is to protect against discrimination in the work
place based upon, among other things, a person's "sex." If a plaintiff can
show that the sexual harassment he or she has experienced was directed to
him/her because of sex, then a Title VII claim exists. In same-gender claims,
the homosexuality of the harasser, though persuasive, should not be the sole
determining factor in deciding whether the harassment was based on sex.
Nor should the heterosexuality of the harasser rule out the possibility of a
viable Title VII claim. Whether the harassment was based on the victim's
sex is a question of fact to be decided by the fact finder. Judge Lawson, in
McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, put it aptly: "Proving that the harassment
was directed at the plaintiff because of sex, rather than for some other reason,
may be an unpleasant and difficult affair, 16
but
0 it is the duty of courts, and
especially ofjuries, to sort out such things."
Linda K. Davis
ADDENDUM

On March 4, 1998, the United States Supreme Court published its
decision of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.161 At long last, the
issue of whether a sexual harassment claim under Title VII is viable when the
162
harasser and victim are the same sex has been answered affirmatively.
The unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, seemed
genuinely confused by the "bewildering variety of stances" taken by courts
that have previously addressed the issue. 163
Not unlike many circuit courts of appeals that have faced this question,
the United States Supreme Court looked for case law precedent on related
issues to support its position that same-gender harassment claims are
actionable under Title VII. For example, the Court referenced its decision in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,164 which extended
Title VII's protection to men as well as women.1 65 The Court observed that it
had previously rejected the notion that individuals do not discriminate
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
464 U.S. 669 (1983).
Id. at 685.
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against members of their own race in Castaneda v. Partida.'" Finally, the
Court cited favorably to Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County,167 where a man filed a claim for sex discrimination against his
employer when a promotion for which he applied was given to a female
employee by his male supervisor.'6 8
The Court relied most heavily upon the statutory language and its
interpretation of broad Congressional intent for its decision that same-sex
harassment claims are not precluded from Title VII actions. Even though
same-gender claims were not the "principal evil" considered by the
legislature when it enacted Title VII, "statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
'
Since the language of Title VII prohibits
by which we are governed."169
"discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex,"17 the Court extended the statute's
coverage to include any sexual harassment that meets the statutory
requirements.' 7' This includes same-gender claims.
Thankfully, the Court went beyond its mere holding, giving guidelines
for plaintiffs wishing to prove same-gender sexual harassment claims under
Title VII. 172 Harassment by a homosexual of another of his/her same-gender
was compared by the Court to traditional male-on-female sexual harassment
claims.' 73 One can assume, the Court reasoned, that the harassment in that
situation is likely due to the person's sex, thus, meeting Title VII's
requirement that the discrimination be because of sex. 74 However, the Court
did not restrict legitimate discriminatory harassment to that based on sexual
desire. If a plaintiff can show that the harasser demonstrated general hostility
toward the presence of the particular gender in the workplace, the because of
sex requirement will be satisfied. 175 Proof of disparate treatment of one sex
in a mixed sex work environment would also constitute legitimate proof that
Finally, the Court
the harassment met the statutory requirement."
emphasized that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow,
he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged
166. 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977).
167. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
168. Id. at 641-42.
169. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1998).
170. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(a) (1994).
171. Oncale, 1998 WL 88039, at *3.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Onacle, 1998 WL 88039, at4.
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with offensive sexual connotations,
but actually constituted 'discrimina[tion]
177
because of... sex."'
While some may construe this decision by the Court to open the gate to
the slippery slope of sexual harassment lawsuits, the Court was quick to
reinforce what it considers a "crucial" requirement of Title VII.'
The
conduct must be so offensive, the Court reminded readers, that it either: 1)
alters the conditions of the victim's employment; or 2) is "severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive. ' 179 Normal social behavior in the workplace ("such as male-onmale horseplay or intersexual flirtation")... is not enough to meet this
standard.'
The Court cautioned that factf'mders must look to the context of
the behavior and use common sense in their determination
of what
82
constitutes actionable sexual harassment under Title VII.1
Although the Court, with its decision in Oncale, has relieved some of
the confusion about same-general sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
questions still remain. For example, what of plaintiffs like Joseph Oncale?
How does Mr. Oncale prove that the sexually humiliating treatment he
received from three male heterosexual co-workers in an all-male work
environment constituted discriminatory treatment because of his sex? Is
sexual harassment in his situation legally possible, even given the arguably
lenient evidentiary guidelines delineated by the Court?
And, what of Mr. Fredette in his same-gender sexual harassment claim
against BVP Management Associates? As of this writing, his claim has not
been reheard by the trial court. Given the Supreme Court's ruling in Oncale,
Mr. Fredette's claim, unlike Mr. Oncale's, may be easier to prove. His
harasser was a known homosexual, thus easing his burden of proving that the
harassment was because of his sex. However, like all sexual harassment
plaintiffs, Mr. Fredette will still need to prove that the harassment he
experienced altered the conditions of his employment in some way and/or
was so abusive or hostile as to offend the "objective" reasonable person.
At least the Supreme Court has now made clear that whether Mr.
Fredette, Mr. Oncale, and other plaintiffs like them, experienced
discriminatory treatment because of their sex is not a legal question, but one
of fact, to be decided by the factfinder.

177. Id.
178. ld

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 50 U.S. 17 (1993)).
lad
Oncale, 1998 WL 88039, at *4.
Id.
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